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I. INTRODUCTION
Latin American judiciaries have been criticized frequently for
lacking independence.' Seldom, however, have the critics explained
the meaning of the talismanic phrase "judicial independence," or
the reasoning behind their determinations that a particular judici-
ary is independent or subservient. Almost never do the critics ex-
plain why an independent judiciary is desirable. They apparently
regard the proposition as self-evident. As Part IT of this essay dem-
onstrates, judicial independence is a concept fraught with ambigui-
ties and unexamined premises. Part III explains the futility of at-
tempts to quantify judicial independence. Part IV explores legal
measures that have been utilized in Latin America to attempt to
insure judicial independence. Part V reviews the methods by which
the independence of Latin American courts has been undermined.
The essay concludes that formal constitutional guarantees of judi-
cial independence have been largely ineffective in much of Latin
America because of certain structural features of Latin American
politics and legal institutions. Until there is a much greater com-
mitment by governments and the governed to the principles of
1. See generally W.R. DUNCAN, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS 152-53 (1976); A. EDELMANN,
LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 477-80 (1969); M. NEEDLER, LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE 154-55 (1967); A. VON LAZAR, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 66, 89 (H. Wiarda & H. Kline eds, 1979); Moreno, Justice and Law in Latin
America: A Cuban Example, 12 J. INTER-Am. STUD. & WORLD AFF_ 367, 373-78 (1970).
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constitutionalism and the rule of law, lack of judicial independence
will continue to plague Latin America.
II. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
What does judicial independence mean? A judiciary is inde-
pendent from whom and independent of what? Why does it matter
whether a judiciary is independent? Is an independent judiciary
always better than a non-independent judiciary? Is judicial inde-
pendence critical to insuring the observance of constitutional guar-
antees? To what extent is judicial independence a function of a
court's ability to avoid deciding highly controversial cases? Is judi-
cial independence measurable?
Judicial independence is a relative rather than absolute con-
cept. All judiciaries are to some extent independent and to some
extent subservient.' Courts simply do not come packed like tennis
balls, hermetically sealed from their environment. Regardless of
whether they are popularly elected, appointed by some combina-
tion of the executive, legislative or judicial branches, or selected by
competitive examination, judges are likely to have a belief system
that mirrors the dominant political culture.
Surely, judicial independence does not require that judges re-
main oblivious to all political considerations when deciding cases.
Political factors, such as whether a nation is at war, whether grant-
ing a requested remedy will indicate disrespect for a coordinate
branch of government, or whether a problem is likely to be better
resolved by the political processes, obviously do, and should, influ-
ence the decisions of independent judiciaries. Moreover, one can
even find independent judiciaries in authoritarian regimes. An in-
triguing study of the Spanish judiciary under Generalissimo
Franco revealed that the ordinary courts functioned with a high
degree of independence, largely because politically sensitive cases
were consistently diverted from the regular courts to special
2. This point was cogently made by Jerome Cohen, former Professor of Law at
Harvard, regarding the judiciary in Communist China:
Judicial independence is not something that simply exists or does not exist.
Each country's political-judicial accommodation must be located along a spec-
trum that only in theory ranges from a completely unfettered judiciary to one
that is completely subservient. The actual situation in all countries lies some-
where in between.
Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and "Judicial Independence": 1949-1959, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 967, 972 (1969).
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tribunals.'
Judicial independence does not mean that judges are free to
decide cases in accordance with their personal predilections. An in-
dependent judge need not sit like a kadi under a banana tree, dis-
pensing justice as he or she sees fit. A judge is not expected to act
independently of the law or in disregard of ethical considerations
or the positions taken by counsel in the case at bar. An indepen-
dent judiciary does not signify an irresponsible judiciary; judges
have a responsibility to decide cases in accordance with preestab-
lished rules of procedural and substantive law.'
One of the most commonly cited definitions of judicial inde-
pendence was proposed by Professor Theodore Becker:
Judicial independence is (a) the degree to which judges believe
they can decide and do decide consistent with their own per-
sonal attitudes, values, and conceptions of the judicial role (in
their interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others,
who have or are believed to have political or judicial power,
think about or desire in like matters, and (c) particularly when a
decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those with political
or judicial power may bring some retribution on the judges per-
sonally or on the power of the court.'
Becker sets out the core concept of judicial independence, but his
definition needs further refinement. One problem is that it simplis-
tically amalgamates the principle of independence from political
authorities with the complex issue of independence from other
judges. Quite different considerations pertain when the issue is the
independence of the judiciary as a corporate body rather than the
internal independence of an individual judge from his judicial col-
leagues. Courts in modern legal systems are typically arranged in
hierarchical fashion. Lower court judges are expected or required
to adhere to the decisions of higher courts for reasons of predict-
ability, uniformity, and sound judicial administration. Even in
countries that do not formally adhere to the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, courts are almost invariably required to adhere to decisions of
higher courts on remand.' Moreover, as a practical matter, lower
3. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Contem-
porary Spain, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 475 (1975).
4. Eckhoff, Impartiality, Separation of Powers, and Judicial Independence, 9 SCANDI-
NAVIAN STUD. IN L. 9, 17 (1965).
5. T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS 144 (1970).
6. One Latin American constitution specifically finds no incompatibility between the
[Vol. 19:1
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courts generally follow decisions of the higher courts, and all levels
of courts generally follow their own decisions.7 Literally applied,
Becker's definition means that the only countries with truly inde-
pendent judiciaries are those that permit judges to ignore decisions
of higher courts. To be sure, one can find an occasional judge who
feels that his independence would be compromised if he were
obliged to follow decisions of a higher court,' but it is difficult to
take these claims seriously. Judicial independence hardly requires
a system in which lower courts are free to ignore the decisions of
the higher courts. Nor is it inconsistent with judiciaries in which
decisions regarding the promotion, removal, transfer, and salaries
of judges are left to more senior judges, who normally take into
account the quality of judicial performance.
Although a higher court can misuse its supervisory powers by
disciplining lower court judges for ideological reasons, the poten-
tial for such abuse should not require insulation of judges from the
basic principle of stare decisis and judicial independence:
Magistrates and Judges are independent in the exercise of their functions and
are submitted only to the Constitution and the Law; but lower court judges are
obliged to obey and carry out decisions of their hierarchical supervisors revoking
or reforming, by virtue of legal appeals, their decisions.
CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REP(BLICA DE PANAMA, art. 207 (1983).
The classic exception to this principle occurs in France, where decisions of the highest ordi-
nary court, the Cour de Cassation, are not binding on the Courts of Appeal until the third
renvoi. As a practical matter, however, French judges pay careful attention to the decisions
of higher courts. R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 43-44
(M. Kindred trans. 1972); P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 158-64 (1967); Yianno-
poulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of Law in Louisiana and in France, in THE
ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 69, 73 (J.
Dainow ed. 1974).
7. M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 208-10
(1985).
8. Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit tells of an Italian trial judge, who upon hearing a lecture explaining common law no-
tions of precedent, leaped to his feet and passionately declared: "My independence as a
judge would be completely undermined if I had to follow the decisions of the court of ap-
peals." Rambling through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935 (1982). For an
unusual decision by a U.S. judge expressing his philosophical adherence to his Italian coun-
terpart, see Judge Campbell's decision in United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
9. A prime example of a tribunal that has misused its supervisory powers for ideological
reasons is the Chilean Supreme Court, which has chilled attempts by lower courts to investi-
gate and prosecute human rights violations by the Pinochet regime. Despite thousands of
complaints alleging unlawful disappearances, tortures, and murders of opponents of the re-
gime by the police and the military, a recent carefully documented study was unable to find
any case where the conviction of a government security agent has been sustained on appeal.
Zabel, Orentlicher & Nachman, Human Rights and the Administration of Justice in Chile,
42 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 431 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar Chile Rep.].
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influence of other judges as a condition of judicial independence.
Judicial independence does not imply judicial irresponsibility. On
the contrary, an independent judiciary wields substantial power
and must be held accountable for the misuse of that power. Judi-
cial accountability can be achieved through a variety of techniques,
including supervision by higher courts or judicial councils.10 If
there were no internal judicial accountability, pressure for inter-
vention by the executive or legislative branches would be impossi-
ble to resist. Historically, the threat to judicial independence from
outside interference has been far greater than from in-house
interference.
A second problem with Becker's definition is that it ignores
the crucial role of the courts in finding and interpreting the facts
as well as the law. If judges or juries are induced to determine the
facts in a skewed manner, interpretation of the law may not mat-
ter. More importantly, failure of the political authorities to cooper-
ate with the courts in finding the facts may wholly frustrate efforts
by the judiciary to operate effectively and independently.11 Simi-
larly, if political authorities intimidate witnesses and lawyers, the
independence of the judiciary will be severely compromised.12
10. See Cappelletti, "Who Watches the Watchmen?" A Comparative Study on Judi-
cial Responsibility, in JuDIciAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 550 (S. Shetreet
& J. Deschenes eds. 1985).
11. The Supreme Court of Argentina was totally frustrated by the refusal of military
authorities to cooperate with the judiciary by providing facts concerning the whereabouts of
thousands of people who mysteriously disappeared in Argentina during the 1970s. The writ
of habeas corpus ceased to be an effective remedy for the protection of the constitutional
rights of life and liberty. Eventually, the Supreme Court was reduced to admitting openly
that the country was suffering from an "absence of justice" because the "judges are being
deprived of those necessary conditions to enable them to exercise their jurisdictional powers
... " P6rez de Smith y otros, 300 Fallos 1283 (1978) (Argen.). See generally Garro, The
Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental Action under a State of
Siege, 4 Hum. R.L.J. 311, 332-37 (1983); Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argen-
tina: The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 LAw. AM. 503 (1984).
During the early 1980s, the Guatemalan judiciary encountered a similar lack of coopera-
tion from the military government when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus for
desaparecidos. AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, GUATEMALA: A NATION OF PRISONERS 21-22
(1984).
A recent examination of the cases involving persons detained by the military in Brazil
during the late 1960s and 1970s revealed that in eighty-five percent of the cases, no notifica-
tion had been given to judicial authorities, and in eleven percent of the cases notification
was given to judicial authorities only after the legal time period had elapsed. TORTURE IN
BRAZIL 78 (J. Dassin ed. 1986).
Chilean authorities have also been notably uncooperative with judicial investigations of
official misconduct under the Pinochet regime. N.Y. Bar City Chile Rep. 454-57, 461-62.
12. There is strong evidence that the Pinochet regime has been intimidating witnesses
in the investigation into the murder of Rodrigo Rojas de Negri, a 19 year-old U.S. resident
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A third difficulty with Becker's definition is that it ignores the
role of private parties in undermining judicial independence
through bribery or intimidation. A judge whose vote can be pur-
chased by money, gifts or favors is hardly independent. Neither is
a judge whose decision is motivated by fear for his personal safety
or that of his family. In Colombia, where fifty-seven judges have
been murdered in the past five years, the bribes of drug traffickers,
often accompanied by exceptionally credible death threats, have
seriously compromised judicial independence."3
Becker's definition can be substantially improved by broaden-
ing its scope and simplifying its language. I would define judicial
independence as the degree to which judges actually decide cases
in accordance with their own determinations of the evidence, the
law and justice, free from the coercion, blandishments, interfer-
ence, or threats of governmental authorities or private citizens.
Judicial independence is indispensable for the fair and unbi-
ased administration of justice. As Judge Irving Kaufman of the
who died while visiting Chile in July 1986. He and a teen-age girl were severely beaten,
doused with gasoline, set afire, and dumped in the outskirts of Santiago, allegedly by mem-
bers of the Chilean military. One of the most important witnesses was arrested and held
incommunicado. Another was kidnapped and ordered to change any testimony that might
have incriminated the military. A third eyewitness was detained and threatened with prose-
cution. Tolerance of these abuses in the investigation casts considerable doubt on the inde-
pendence of the Chilean judiciary. See OAS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1985-1986, 135-39 (1986); see also N.Y. City Bar Chile Rep. 441-
48.
The practice of intimidating witnesses and lawyers occurred regularly in Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay in the 1970s during the height of campaigns by military regimes to
eliminate subversive elements. See Plight of Defence Lawyers in Argentina, 14 REV. INT'L
COMM. JURISTS 1-3 (1975); Steiner & Trubek, Brazil - All Power to the Generals, 49 FOR.
ApF. 464, 472 (1971). Intimidation and harassment of defense lawyers is still going on in
Chile. Sagaris, Chile: Fighting to Abolish Tyranny, 15 STUD. LAw. 24, 29-30 (1987); see also
N.Y. City Bar Chile Rep. 465-79.
13. See Riding, Cocaine Billionaires: The Men Who Hold Colombia Hostage, N.Y.
Times Magazine, Mar. 8, 1987, Sec. 6 at 27. See also Deaths Mount as Drug War Rages,
The Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 1987, at 18. Violence has claimed not only lives of 36 lower
court judges, but of a dozen members of the Supreme Court as well. Eleven members of
Colombia's Supreme Court were killed on Nov. 5, 1985, when the army stormed the Palace
of Justice after its seizure by leftist guerrillas. Another Supreme Court Justice, Hernando
Baquero Borda, was assassinated on July 30, 1986. Even Ministers of Justice have been
vulnerable to assassins' bullets. Assassins killed Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla on
Apr. 30, 1984. Despite being dispatched as ambassador to Hungary for safekeeping, ex-Min-
ister of Justice Enrique Parejo Gonzalez was shot five times and nearly killed in Budapest.
If Colombia is unable to protect the lives of those at the top of the judicial hierarchy, how
can lower court judges be expected to resist the blandishments and threats of drug traffick-
ers. See also Flanders, Court Administration in Colombia: An American Visitor's Perspec-
tive, 7 JUDICATURE 36, 37-38 (1987).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained:
"Adjudication based upon the noble precept 'equal justice under
law' requires impartiality, and impartiality demands freedom from
political pressure." '14 Societies in which justice is rarely obtainable
tend to be highly unstable. Furthermore, the personal and transac-
tional insecurity arising from the type of justice delivered by a de-
pendent judiciary is likely to retard socio-economic development
by deterring investment and productive economic activity.
How much judicial independence is desirable usually depends
upon the extent to which one agrees or disagrees with the outcome
of judicial decisions, particularly those involving constitutional in-
terpretation. Judicial independence tends to be lauded by liberals
and decried by conservatives when the decisions follow a liberal
bent; conversely, judicial independence tends to be deplored by the
liberals and praised by conservatives when the decisions take a
conservative tack. In a universalistic legal system (i.e., where the
same rules are meant to apply to all), judicial independence would
be desirable if one were seriously committed to the ideal of equal
justice under law for all persons. On the other hand, if one were
committed to the maintenance of class privileges and the feudal
notion of one law for the elites and another for the masses, an in-
dependent judiciary would be undesirable.
III. MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain
or measure. Judicial opinions sometimes display independence, but
they almost always attempt to conceal lack of independence. Sub-
servient judges do not write opinions indicating that the result
would have been different had they been independent. Instead,
they attempt to rationalize their decisions as compelled by law
rather than by outside influence. Judges may act independently in
certain kinds of cases but not in others. The same judges may also
be independent during specific periods but subservient during
others. Public perceptions of judicial independence may change
even though a court may regard itself as possessing the same de-
gree of independence. For example, the Chilean Supreme Court
was widely regarded as very independent because it had openly
clashed with the executive, publicly accusing the Allende regime of
14. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 684 (1979).
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violating the Constitution.'" After Pinochet's overthrow of Allende,
however, the Chilean Supreme Court was widely regarded as sub-
servient because it failed to stand up to the military and defend
individual constitutional rights. Because the Chilean Supreme
Court has sympathized with the political goals of the Pinochet re-
gime, public perception of the Court's loss of independence has
been somewhat exaggerated."i
Perhaps the only people who fully comprehend the degree to
which they are actually independent are the judges themselves,
and even they may have no clear idea until circumstances arise
that test their independence. Some judges may even be unaware
that their court's independence has been compromised because one
or more of its members has been bribed, intimidated or subjected
to other forms of pressure.
Attempts to quantify judicial independence suffer from serious
methodological infirmities. Professor Kenneth Johnson attempted
to gauge political democracy in Latin America by asking a select
group of social scientists specializing in Latin America to fill out
questionnaires rating the twenty republics with respect to fifteen
factors, one of which was judicial independence. Johnson defined
judicial independence as "the extent of respect for the court's deci-
sions," "the extent to which the court has the courage of its convic-
tions" and "is free from executive domination," whether "decisions
are dignified and founded on law," and the extent to which people
and political leaders rely "on judicial processes rather than arbi-
trary executive or legislative action or military force."17 His meth-
15. See Velasco, The Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical and Legal Analysis: Part
11, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 711, 726-27 (1976); Hudson, Role of Constitutional Conflict over Na-
tionalization in the Downfall of Salvador Allende, 31 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 63 (Spring
1978).
16. See R. ALEXANDER, THE TRAGEDY OF CHILE 349-51 (1978). It should be noted that
the Chilean Junta effectively foreclosed judicial review of its decree-laws by declaring that
in the event of any incompatibility between the Constitution and any of the Junta's decree-
laws, the Junta was implicitly or explicitly exercising its constituent power and the Consti-
tution should be deemed to be modified accordingly. Decreto-Ley No. 788, No. 29.019
DIARIO OFICIAL 4227 (4 de diciembre 1974) (Chile). Moreover, it seems clear that the inde-
pendence of the Chilean judiciary has been seriously compromised by its overlooking or
condoning flagrant human rights violations. N.Y. City Bar Chile Rep. at 436-39; Sagaris,
supra note 12; Press Airs Erosion of the System, Lat. Am. Weekly Rep., Aug. 6, 1987, at 3.
At least one U.S. court has expressed substantial doubts about the degree of judicial inde-
pendence in Chile because of the expressed power of the Junta to amend or rescind consti-
tutional provisions by decree. Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Paci-
ico S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. See Verner, The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin America: A Review of
1987]
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odology produced numerical scores from which he ranked Latin
American judiciaries with respect to independence. Between 1945
and 1975, Costa Rica received the highest scores and Haiti the low-
est.'" Johnson's methodology creates the delusion of mathematical
certainty, but it is still only the collective hearsay of eighty-four
social scientists, most of whom are historians and political scien-
tists rather than lawyers practicing before the judiciaries being
ranked.
A more ambitious attempt at quantification was made by
Pablo' Gonzalez-Casanova, a sociologist who analyzed 3,700
amparoe decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Mexico be-
tween 1917 and 1960, in which the President of the Republic was
named as the defending authority. Gonzalez-Casanova found that
the claimants were granted amparo in thirty-four percent and de-
nied amparo in thirty-four percent of the cases; in twenty-four
percent the cases were discontinued or not ruled upon, and in nine
percent other types of rulings were entered. 0 The data were fur-
ther refined by determining the social class to which the amparo
claimant belonged. Ultimately, Gonzalez-Casanova concluded that:
... [T]he Supreme Court of Justice operates with a certain de-
gree of independence with respect to the executive power, some-
times exercising a controlling action over the President or his
assistants. The Court subjects to judgment certain acts coming
from the Executive. Its main political function is to provide
hope for those groups and individuals who are able to utilize this
recourse to protect their interests or rights....
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Justice is en-
dowed with power, yet it does generally follow the policy of the
Executive, and in fact it serves to make the Executive more
stable."'
the Literature, 16 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 463, 478 (1984).
18. Id. at 479.
19. In Mexican law, amparo is a complex action that can function as a writ of habeas
corpus, injunction, declaratory judgment, or appeal. A leading Mexican jurist has observed
that the Mexican amparo combines the following five procedural functions: (1) protection of
life and liberty, (2) a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation, (3) resolution of con-
flicts from administrative acts or decisions, (4) appeal of judicial decisions, and (5) protec-
tion of peasant rights in agrarian reform. Fix-Zamudio, El Problema de Lentitud de los
Procesos y su Solucibn en el Ordenamiento Mexicano, 21 REvISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DER-
ECHO DE M9xICo, 85, 116 (1971).
20. P. GONZALEZ-CAsANOVA, DEMOCRACY IN MEXIco 23-24 (D. Salti trans. 2d ed. 1970).
21. Id.
[Vol. 19:1
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Query whether Gonzalez-Casanova's data really support his
conclusions. His data tell us nothing about the importance of the
challenged acts or laws to the Executive. Because of typical litiga-
tion delays, the act or law challenged in an amparo proceeding will
often be the product of a prior government. The present regime
may have little or no interest in maintaining the disputed measure
in force. Moreover, in all constitutional amparo actions, the Presi-
dent of Mexico must be named as a party because he signed the
law, not because he is necessarily interested in the outcome.22 Nor
does Gonzalez-Casanova's data tell us how many cases involved the
same act or law, how many challenges were avoided on procedural
grounds, how many patently unconstitutional governmental ac-
tions were sustained, or how many statutes were reinterpreted to
avoid constitutional difficulties. These questions cannot be an-
swered without more sophisticated data. Looking only at the per-
centage of amparo cases decided for or against the claimant may
convey a misleading sense of the degree of judicial independence in
Mexico.
A more ambitious attempt at massaging the Mexican data was
made by Professor Carl Schwarz, who compared the percentage of
amparo actions decided in favor of the nongovernmental party in
penal cases before the Mexican Supreme Court with the percent-
age of habeas corpus cases decided in favor of the nongovernmen-
tal party in the United States Supreme Court in a thirty-three-
month period.13 Unfortunately, the comparisons are misleading be-
cause the jurisdictional requirements for the two kinds of cases are
very different. Since every claim of misapplication of state law by
the state courts can be converted into a federal constitutional issue
under Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution, amparo often serves
as the functional equivalent of a direct appeal from the state
courts to the federal courts.2 4 Moreover, one has to distinguish be-
tween pretrial habeas corpus or amparo cases, which may involve
tension between the executive and the judiciary, and post-convic-
22. See 132 SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE LA FEDERACI6N 126 (Sexta Epoca, June 1968
primera parte) and cases cited therein.
23. Schwarz, Judges under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United States
and Mexico, 3 CAL. W INT'L L.J. 260 (1973). See also Schwarz, Rights and Remedies in the
Federal District Courts of Mexico and the United States, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67 (1977),
comparing U.S. federal district court dispositions of habeas corpus and Section 1983 civil
rights actions with Mexican federal district court dispositions of indirect amparos in penal
and administrative cases.
24. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 Orno ST. LJ. 785, 797-98 (1974).
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tion habeas corpus or amparo cases, where the appellate court
generally reviews the conduct of the lower court. It is by no means
clear that a relatively low percentage of habeas corpus or amparo
cases decided against the government indicates anything about the
degree to which judicial independence exists. Judicial indepen-
dence becomes a critical factor only in those relatively few cases
where the political authorities are deeply concerned that a particu-
lar result obtain, and that result differs from the one the judges
would reach if left to their own devices.
Judicial independence is both too complex and too subtle a
concept to be measured by such crude and misleading techniques
as calculating the percentage of habeas corpus or amparo cases de-
cided against the government. If a country scrupulously observes
the law and the constitution in the administration of criminal jus-
tice, habeas corpus should never be granted. Indeed, a low per-
centage of habeas corpus petitions decided against the government
may signify a high degree of compliance with the law and with con-
stitutional guarantees. On the other hand, it might also signify ju-
dicial impotence in the face of a regime that makes people disap-
pear without any legal process and which refuses to acknowledge
any information concerning the whereabouts of persons on whose
behalf writs of habeas corpus are filed. 5 Actually, in terms of
sheer volume of cases, corruption is more likely to pose a greater
threat to judicial independence than does political influence. The
incentive to bribe is present in virtually every case, while the in-
centive for political authorities to apply pressure is present only
when one of the parties is politically well-connected or the case is
deemed to have some important political implication.
If perfect information existed regarding the judicial decision-
making process and the mental state of each judge in every coun-
try, one could plot the positions of judiciaries on a spectrum be-
tween the poles of total subordination and total independence.
(Each country's judiciary would undoubtedly fall somewhere be-
tween these two poles.) Unfortunately, nothing close to perfect in-
formation on judicial decision-making is available for any country.
Even if it were, it would still have to be interpreted in light of the
25. See P6rez de Smith y otros, supra note 11, where the Supreme Court of Argentina
overtly admitted the absence of justice in Argentina. Because the military government re-
fused to acknowledge the whereabouts of thousands of persons secretly and extrajudicially
detained by the military, the Argentine courts found it impossible to implement the remedy
of habeas corpus.
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intense doctrinal debates regarding how activist a role the judiciary
should play. 6
IV. LEGAL MEASURES GUARANTEEING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The constitutions of all Latin American countries provide for
independent judiciaries. Some do so in formalistic fashion, simply
declaring that the judiciary shall be independent." Others contain
a panoply of measures designed to insure the independence of the
judiciary. Analytically, these prophylactic measures can be divided
into two broad overlapping categories: (1) protection of the integ-
rity of the judicial decision-making process from outside pressures,
and (2) protection of the personal independence of the judge.
A. Measures to Protect the Integrity of Judicial Decisions
1. Guaranty of Noninterference with Judicial Proceedings
One of the most common measures to insure the integrity of
the judicial process is a constitutional prohibition against any in-
terference by other branches of government with judicial proceed-
ings. Perhaps the most explicit statement of this form of guaranty
is found in Peru's 1980 Constitution:
Art. 233. The following are guarantees of the administration of
justice:
26. Compare A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 127-33 (1962); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977), with M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" -
A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
27. CONSTITUci6N POLITICA DEL ESTADO, art. 117 (Bol. 1967) ("Judges are independent
in the administration of justice and are subject only to the Laws."); CONSTITUCI6N DE LA
REPUBLICA DE CUBA, art. 125 (1976) ("The judges, in their function of administering justice,
are independent and owe obedience only to the Law."); CONSTITUCION DE LA REP(IBLICA
DOMINICANA, art. 4 (1966) ("These three branches [the legislative, executive, and the judici-
ary] are independent in the exercise of their respective functions."); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA
DE LA REPKELICA DE GUATEMALA, art. 203 (1985) ("The magistrates and judges are indepen-
dent in the exercise of their functions and are exclusively subjected to the Constitution of
the Republic and the Laws."); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE NICARAGUA, art.
165 (1986) ("In their judicial activity, Supreme Court Judges and other Judges are indepen-
dent and must obey only the Constitution and the Law .. "); CONSTITUCIdN POLITICA DE
LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 207 (1983) ("Magistrates and judges are independent in the
exercise of their functions and are subject only to the Constitution and the Law."); LA CON-
STITUCION PARAGUAYA, art. 199 (1967) ("The independence of the judicial power is
guaranteed.").
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. 2. Independence in its exercise. No authority may assume
jurisdiction in cases pending before the judiciary or interfere in
the exercise of its functions. Neither can court cases that are res
judicata be unenforced, ongoing court proceedings be cut off,
judgments modified, nor their execution delayed. This provision
does not affect the right to a pardon.
The constitutions of Argentina, Chile and Paraguay contain similar
guaranties preventing their presidents or congresses from exercis-
ing judicial functions or interfering with judicial decisions.28
2. Jurisdictional Monopoly
Latin America has a long tradition of creating special tribunals
to decide certain classes of cases, particularly those involving labor
disputes, military justice, agrarian reform, subversives, administra-
tive law and electoral disputes.2 9 Such practice undermines judicial
independence when these special tribunals are exempt from any
form of control by the regular judiciary.3 0 A related technique that
also undermines judicial independence is the transfer of jurisdic-
tion normally exercised by the regular courts to specially created
ad hoc tribunals. Rarely do Latin American constitutions restrict
such practices in the interest of safeguarding judicial indepen-
dence. The Peruvian Constitution of 1980 is an exception, for it
provides for the unity and exclusivity of the judiciary's jurisdiction
and denies the other branches the power to establish any other in-
dependent jurisdiction except for military and arbitral tribunals. 1
More common in Latin American constitutions are provisions spec-
ifying that only the judiciary may decide disputes of a litigious na-
ture, 2 or that only tribunals established by law may decide crimi-
nal or civil cases.33
28. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, art. 95 (1853); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE
LA REPJBLICA DE CHILE, art. 73 (1980); LA CONSTITUC16N PARAGUAYA, art. 199 (1967).
29. See H. CLAGETT, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA 55-6 (1952).
30. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
31. CONSTITUcI6N POLtTICA DEL PERU, art. 233(1) (1980).
32. LA CONSTITUCION PARAGUAYA, art. 199 (1967).
33. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DR LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE, art. 73 (1980); LA CONSTITUTION
HAITIENNE, art. 173-1 (1987). The Honduran variation provides that the judging of cases and
the enforcement of judgments is the exclusive province of the courts. CONSTITUCION DE LA
REPOBLICA DE HONDURAS, art. 314 (1982).
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3. Requiring a Reasoned Opinion
A third technique to protect the integrity of the decision-mak-
ing process is requiring judges to write reasoned opinions explain-
ing their decisions. s4 This requirement does not immunize judges
from bribes and political pressures. Nevertheless, by exposing judi-
cial decisions to public scrutiny, this requirement makes it more
difficult for judges to rationalize "corrupt" rulings. Additionally, a
reasoned opinion improves the judicial process by insuring that
courts decide in accordance with the law.
4. Requiring Public Trials
Publicity can also effectively curb judicial arbitrariness and
corruption. It is easier to "fix" cases that are never exposed to pub-
lic scrutiny. Accordingly, several Latin American countries require
that certain cases be decided in open court. For example, Peru re-
quires that all cases in which the defendants are public officials,
those involving press crimes and those involving fundamental
rights guaranteed by the constitution be tried in open court.35
B. Measures Protecting Personal Independence
1. Irreducibility of Judicial Salaries
Several Latin American constitutions have followed the exam-
ple of the United States in attempting to protect a judge's inde-
pendence by providing that his compensation may not be dimin-
ished during his term of office. 36 The underlying policy is to
protect judges from financial retribution for rendering decisions
that displease the legislature or the executive. Originally, Article
127 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 went one step further and
also prohibited the raising of salaries of Supreme Court members
during their term in office. This idea, which originated in the origi-
34. CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA DEL PERU, art. 233(4) (1980); C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS
CIVILES, arts. 81-86 (Costa Rica 1982 ed.). C6DIGo JUDICIAL DE PANAMA, art. 1034 (1986 rev.).
35. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERU, art. 233(3) (1980). Cf. LA CONSTITUTION HAI-
TIENNE, arts. 180-1 and 180 (1987), which require that all political and journalistic offenses
be tried in open court, and that all hearings in other cases be open unless public order or
morality dictates a closed trial.
36. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, art. 96 (1863); CONSTIRUICO FEDERAL DA
REPcB;ICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, art. 113 (I1) (1967); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA,
art. 160 (1886); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 94 (1917).
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nal draft of the Compensation Clause of the U.S. Constitution, was
designed to promote judicial independence by insulating judges
from the blandishment of salary increases.37 In 1982, severe infla-
tion forced Mexico to replace this prohibition against salary in-
creases with a provision calling for adequate compensation to be
determined annually in an equitable manner. 8
An alternative formulation of this aspect of the protection of
judicial independence can be found in Peru's Constitution, which
guarantees its judges "a compensation that insures for them a life
worthy of their mission in the hierarchy."39 Standing alone this
vague provision would appear to provide little protection for judi-
cial compensation. It is more meaningful, however, because it is
coupled with a constitutional provision guaranteeing the judiciary
a minimum percentage of the country's budget."0
Uruguay maintains one of the most effective guaranties of ju-
dicial salaries in a chronically inflationary environment. Since
1981, the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court (which in
practice determine the salaries of the rest of the judiciary), cannot
be less than those of Ministers Secretaries of State.41 Since the
Ministers are well paid, this measure has assured adequate judicial
compensation in Uruguay.2 A similar measure has been adopted in
Panama.43
2. Guaranteeing the Judiciary a Fixed Percentage of the
Government's Budget
A second technique for assuring financial independence is a
constitutional requirement that a fixed percentage of the country's
total budget be allocated to the judiciary. The most generous of
these provisions is that of Costa Rica, which grants the judiciary
37. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution rejected the prohibition of judicial salary in-
creases for the protection of judicial independence because increased caseloads and inflation
might decrease the real value of judicial compensation, and alterations in the state of society
might require more attractive judicial salaries in order to maintain the same calibre of per-
sonnel. Rosenn, The Constitutional Guaranty against Diminution of Judicial Compensa-
tion, 24 UCLA L. REv. 308, 312-18 (1976).
38. Decreto de Reformas y Adiciones al Titulo Cuatro, D.O. 28 de diciembre 1982.
39. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU, art. 242(3) (1980).
40. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
41. Acto Institucional No. 12, art. 6, 10 de Noviembre 1981, (Uru.).
42. Vescovi, Uruguay, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 374, 377
(S. Shetreet & J. Deschenes eds. 1985).
43. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 210 (1983).
[Vol. 19:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
no less than six percent of the nation's ordinary annual receipts."
Honduras assures the judiciary an annual appropriation of at least
three percent of the nation's annual receipts, excluding loans and
grants,'  while Peru guarantees the judiciary two percent of the
current budget of the Central Government.4 6 Guatemala and Pan-
ama combine the Costa Rican and Peruvian approaches, constitu-
tionally mandating that the judiciary's budget will be at least two
percent of the nation's ordinary annual receipts."
Unfortunately, these constitutional guarantees have some-
times been honored in the breach. Moreover, in many countries,
substantial percentages of governmental expenditures are not in-
cluded in the budget. Nonetheless, such guarantees still perform a
useful function in providing the judiciary with valuable leverage at
budget time. The lack of a similar constitutional guaranty has had
drastic consequences for the Argentine and Bolivian judiciaries. "8
Complaints about the inadequacy of judicial salaries in Latin
America are widespread. 9
3. Tenure in Office
A third technique to insure personal judicial independence is
the constitutional guaranty of tenure in office. Argentina and Mex-
ico follow the model of the U.S. Constitution, assuring federal
44. CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA DE LA REP(JBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 177 (1949).
45. CONSTITUCi6)N DR LA REPOBLICA DE HONDURAS, art. 306 (1982).
46. CONSTITUC1IN POLITICA DEL PuRU, art. 238 (1980). Unfortunately, this guaranty has
never been enforced. The judiciary received .34% of the national budget in 1980, .69% in
1981, .70% in 1982, .81% in 1983, .72% in 1984, and .78% in 1985. Report Condemns Peru's
Judiciary, Lat. Am. Weekly Rep., Feb. 22, 1985, at 6.
47. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPULICA DE GUATEMALA, art. 213 (1985); CONSTITU-
CI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 211 (1983).
48. In 1900, Argentina devoted 3.8% of its national budget to the federal judiciary.
That figure has fallen steadily, and by the end of 1984, only 0.79% of the federal budget was
allocated to the judiciary. Serra, Poder Judicial: Su Presupuesto, 1985-C L.L. 1230-31
(1985) (Argen.). Article 119 of the 1967 Bolivian Constitution simply provides that each year
the nation's budget will allocate a fixed and sufficient, albeit unspecified, amount to the
judiciary. This provision has worked badly, effectively leaving the judiciary with insufficient
resources and at the mercy of the other branches of government. See Exposici6n de Mo-
tivos, Hacia la Reforma Constitucional, in CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACI6N,
LABORES JUDICIALES 45-46 (1981).
49. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. See also Explanation of Motives for
a Draft Judicial Reform Bill in I, BURGOA, EL JuICIO DE AMPARO 1011 (1981); H. Fernandez-
Sandoval, Bases para una Reforma Integral de la Justicia 22-23 (1986) (transcript of
speech); Ovalle Favela, La Independencia Judicial en el Derecho Mexicano, 49 BOL. MEX.
DER. Comp. 55, 68-70 (1984).
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judges lifetime tenure pending good behavior.5 The constitutions
of several other Latin American countries protect tenure in office
pending good behavior until a specified retirement age.5' Such
measures can be nearly as effective as a guaranty of lifetime tenure
only if the judicial retirement system is satisfactory. Unfortu-
nately, chronic inflation has wreaked havoc with many retirement
programs, thereby undermining these guaranties of judicial inde-
pendence. It is more common in the majority of Latin American
countries to limit the terms of office of members of their Supreme
Courts to four to ten years."2
Removal of a judge for cause is generally entrusted to other
members of the judiciary, often in the form of an appellate court
or a council of magistrates." Chile has a review system in which all
judges below the level of the Supreme Court are graded annually
by the Supreme Court. Those whose performance is deemed sub-
standard for two consecutive years and those graded unacceptable
for a single time are automatically dismissed, regardless of their
tenure." Argentina and Mexico, follow the U.S. model of impeach-
ment by the legislature.5 Brazil, Haiti and Paraguay provide for
impeachment by the Senate for members of the highest court,
while other members of the judiciary are tried before the Supreme
Court in Brazil and Paraguay, and before the regular courts in Ha-
iti.56 At least in theory (although not necessarily in practice), no
50. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, art. 96 (1853). Mexico's slight variation
provides that Supreme Court justices hold office for life pending good behavior, whereas
Circuit and District Court judges initially have a four-year term; if re-elected or promoted,
they acquire lifetime tenure. CONSTITUCIN POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS,
arts. 94, 97 (1917).
51. CONSTITUIQ.O FEDERAL DA REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, art. 113 (1) & (Ill) §2
(1969) (tenure until retirement age of 70); CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 148
(1886) (members of the Supreme Court and the Council of State have tenure until the age
of compulsory retirement, fixed by statute at age 75); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOB-
LICA DR CHILE, art. 77 (1980) (tenure until retirement age of 75); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL
PERU, art. 242(2) (1980) (tenure until retirement age of 70).
52. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
53. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DR COSTA RICA, art. 165 (1949) (Supreme
Court justices can be removed only by the secret vote of two-thirds of the members of the
Supreme Court); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERU, art. 248 (1980) (Supreme Court has the
investigative responsibility over the official conduct of judges).
54. C6DIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, arts. 275-77 (7th ed. 1977) (Chile).
55. CONSTITUCION DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, arts. 45, 51, 52 (1853); CONSTITUCI6N POLiT-
ICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 110 (1917).
56. CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL DA REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, art. 42(11) (1969); LA
CONSTITUTION 1-IAITIENNE, arts. 177, 184-1, 185 (1987); LA CONSTITUCI6N PARAGUAYA, arts.
151(3), 196 (1968).
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Latin American country permits the executive to remove or trans-
fer judges.
4. The Selection and Reappointment Processes
The selection process is critical in assuring an independent ju-
diciary. If entrusted to the executive without constraints on its ex-
ercise, the risk of appointment of unqualified candidates or per-
sons selected primarily on the basis of political or personal loyalty
becomes exceedingly high. Consequently, most Latin American
countries have set forth minimal qualifications for membership on
the Supreme Court. 7 Many Latin American countries have created
career judiciaries with entry based on competitive examinations
and comparison of credentials, evaluated by the judiciary itself.58
Brazil, which has a career judiciary, nevertheless reserves a certain
percentage of lateral appointments on appellate courts for practic-
ing lawyers or state attorneys in order to provide varied legal per-
spectives on its top courts. '9
Members of the highest courts in Latin America are generally
selected according to one of the following four models: (1) free ex-
ecutive selection with some form of legislative or judicial approval
as a check, (2) free executive selection, (3) executive selection from
a list of prescreened candidates prepared by the judiciary or the
legislature, or (4) legislative selection. Curiously, popular election
of judges is eschewed on the ground that such a measure would
compromise judicial independence by forcing judges to engage in
political activity.
The presidential selection system (modeled on the U.S. Con-
57. A typical set of qualifications can be found in Panama's Constitution. To be a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court, a candidate must: (a) be a native-born Panamanian; (b) be at
least 35 years old; (c) be in full enjoyment of his political and civil rights; (d) possess a duly
registered law degree; and (e) have at least ten years experience as a practicing lawyer,
judge, or law professor. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 201 (1983).
58. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 162 (1886) and Estatuto de la Carrera
Judicial y del Ministerio Piblico, Decreto-Ley No. 250 of 1970, Vol. CVI, No. 33023 DIARIO
OFICIAL 809 (28 de marzo 1970) (Colom.); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE EL
SALVADOR, arts. 182(9), 186; CONSTITUIvAo FEDERAL DA REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA Do BRASIL,
arts. 113 (I1 §1), 136 (1) & (II), as amended by Emenda No. 7 de 13 de abril 1977; LEY DE
ORGANIZAC16N JUDICIAL, arts. 207-216 (1972 ed.) (Bol.); Acto Institutional No. 12, art. 1, 10
de noviembre 1981 (Uru.). See also Quintero, La Iadepeadencia Judicial, 10 ANUARIo OF
DERECHO 15, 25-27 (1972) (Pan.).
59. Tacito & Barbosa Moreira, Judicial Conflicts of Interest in Brazilian Law, 18 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 689, 690-91 (1970).
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stitution) is used in Argentina, where the president appoints all
the federal judges with the consent of the Senate.8 0 Paraguay has
adopted a similar model, albeit with an important variation: the
President, with the consent of the Senate, appoints the Supreme
Court, but only for a five-year term. The President also appoints
the other judges, with the consent of the Supreme Court.61 Until
this year, Haiti was the only country in Latin America that for-
mally granted its President unfettered discretion to appoint the ju-
diciary.2 Haiti's new Constitution now limits such discretion by
requiring the President to choose members for ten year terms to
the highest court, the Court of Cassation, from a list of three can-
didates prepared by the Senate. 3 Chile has adopted a presidential
selection model in which the President fills vacancies on the Su-
preme Court and the Courts of Appeals from a list of names pro-
posed by the Supreme Court itself.6 4 The Mexican President, with
the approval of the Senate, appoints the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn selects the Circuit Court and District Court
judges."s In Panama, the Cabinet Council (the President and his
Cabinet Ministers) appoints members of the Supreme Court for
ten-year terms. The Supreme Court appoints the appellate courts,
which in turn appoint the judges immediately lower in the hierar-
chy.6  The Peruvian President appoints the judges upon the rec-
ommendation of the National Council of the Magistracy."'
In a majority of Latin American countries members of the
highest courts must win legislative approval to continue in office. It
is common for the legislature to elect members of the Supreme
Court for terms of office that vary between four and ten years.6 In
60. CONSTITUCION DR LA NACION ARGENTINA, art. 86(5) (1853).
61. LA CONSTITUCION PARAGUAYA, arts. 180(8), 195 (1968).
62. LA CONSTITUTION HAITIENNE, art. 114 (1983).
63. LA CONSTITUTION HAITIENNE, at arts. 174, 175 (1987). The president appoints lower
court judges for seven year terms from a list of three candidates prepared by the relevant
Departmental Assembly.
64. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPCBLICA DE CHILE, art. 75 (1980).
65. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, arts. 96, 97 (1917).
66. CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, arts. 200, 206 (1983).
67. CONSTITUCi6N POLITICA DEL PERU, art. 245 (1980).
68. The Supreme Court of Bolivia is elected for ten-year renewable terms by the Cham-
ber of Representatives from lists of three candidates prepared by the Senate. District Court
judges have six-year terms, while other judges serve for only four years. CONSTITUCI6N
POLITICA DEL ESTADO, arts. 125, 126 (Bol. 1967). Members of Costa Rica's Supreme Court
are elected by the legislature for eight-year terms. CONSTITUcION POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA
DE COSTA RICA, arts. 157, 158 (1949). Cuba's Supreme Court consists of 26 professional
judges elected by the National Assembly for five-year terms. There are also 156 lay judges
[Vol. 19:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Costa Rica, a justice is automatically reelected to an additional
eight-year term unless at least two-thirds of the legislature vote
affirmatively for removal.09 A similar system exists in El Salvador,
where Supreme Court members automatically remain in office for
renewable five-year terms unless the legislature expressly votes
them out."0 In contrast, members of Uruguay's Supreme Court
may not be reelected after they have completed a ten-year term
until a five-year waiting period has elapsed. 71 Such measures leave
judges vulnerable to legislative pressures. Since Latin American
legislatures are often themselves dominated by the executive, a leg-
islative approval system may still leave Latin American judges vul-
nerable to threats or blandishments by the executive.
5. Transferability of Judges
Some Latin American constitutions protect judges against in-
voluntary transfers." Others bestow upon the highest court un-
elected by the National Assembly as co-judges on the Supreme Court, each serving two
months per year during a thirty month term. Berman & Whiting, Impressions of Cuban
Law, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 475, 479 (1980). The Dominican Supreme Court and all lower court
judges are elected by the Senate for four-year terms. CONSTITUCI6N Dg LA REPOBLICA DOMIN-
ICANA, art. 23 (1966). Supreme Court Justices in Ecuador are appointed by the National
House of Representatives for renewable six-year terms. CONSTITuCI6N DEL ECUADOR, art. 101
(1979). The Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador is elected by the Legislative Assembly
for a five-year term. CONSTITUCi6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, art. 186
(1983). Members of the Supreme Court in Honduras are elected by the legislature for four-
year renewable terms. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE HONDURAS, art. 305 (1982). Guate-
mala has a six-year term for members of its Supreme Court - four members of the Su-
preme Court are elected directly by the Congress, and five are selected by the Congress from
a list of thirty names submitted by a committee of law school deans, representatives of the
bar assocation, and a representative of the judiciary selected by the Supreme Court. CONSTI-
TUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE GUATEMALA, art. 215 (1985). The Supreme Court of
Justice of Nicaragua is elected for a six-year term by the National Assembly from slates of
three candidates submitted by the President of the Republic. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA
REPfJBLICA DE NICARAGUA, art. 163 (1987). The Supreme Court of Uruguay is elected by the
Council of the Nation for ten-year terms. CONSTITuci6N DE LA REP0BLICA ORIENTAL DEL URU-
GUAV, art. 2 as amended by Acto Institutional No. 12 art. 2, 10 de noviembre 1981 (Uru.).
The Supreme Court of Venezuela is elected by the legislature for nine-year terms. LA CON-
STITUC16N DE LA REPOBLICA DE VENEZUELA, art. 214 (1961).
69. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPeIBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 158 (1949).
70. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, art. 186 (1983).
71. Acto Institutional Act No. 12, art. 2, 10 de noviembre 1981 (Uru.).
72. CONSTITUiQAO FEDERAL DA REPfJBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, art. 113 (I) & (III)
(1969) Ijudges transferable only by a secret two-third vote of a higher tribunal); CONSTITU-
c16N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 160 (1886) (judges may not be transferred to other employ-
ment in a different branch without leaving their postions); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA
REP(JLICA DE PANAMA, art. 208 (1983) (magistrates and judges transferable only for reasons
provided by law). See also LEY DE ORGANiZACi6N JUDICIAL, art. 19 (1972) (Bol.) (a judge not
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restricted power to transfer judges. 73 Because an involuntary trans-
fer can be punitive and is often regarded as tantamount to an
invitation to resign, the lack of constraints on transference can se-
riously compromise personal judicial independence.
6. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest
It is common practice in Latin America to prohibit judges
from engaging in any other form of economic activity, other than
writing or teaching, in order to avoid conflicts of interest.74 Many
countries also prohibit judges from engaging in political activi-
ties.75 Brazil bars judges from participating in commerce or acting
as a director or administrator of any business firm, 6 while Chile
prohibits judges from owning mining interests within the judge's
territorial district.
77
7. Judicial Immunity
Judicial independence can be threatened by vexatious lawsuits
by litigants who claim they have been injured by judges who have
either maliciously or negligently applied the law. The Anglo-Amer-
ican approach is to accord judicial immunity from such lawsuits;
France immunizes its regular judiciary from civil suits, but permits
victims of judicial negligence to sue the state. Italy makes its
judges personally liable, but also imposes liability on the state.78 In
transferable without his express consent).
73. E.g., CONSTUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 97 (1917).
74. CONSTITUcicAo FEDERAL DA REP(IBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, art. 114 (1969) (pro-
hibits judge from engaging in any other professional or political activity except university
teaching or serving on the electoral court); CONSTrrucION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 160
(1886) (prohibits judges from holding any other paid office or from practicing law, but per-
mits university teaching); LA CONSTITUTION HAITIENNE, art. 179 (1987) (prohibits judges
from all other salaried employment except teaching); CONSTITUC16N DE LA REPUBLICA DE
HONDURAS, art. 311 (1982) (prohibits judges from the practice of law and all other govern-
mental employment except teaching or being a diplomat-at-large); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA
DEL PERU, art. 243 (1980) (prohibits judges from engaging in any other professional or politi-
cal activity except university teaching, and prohibits judges from unionizing or striking).
75. CONSTITUCION DEL ECUADOR, art. 104 (1979); CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA DE LA REPOB-
LICA DE PANAMA, arts. 205, 209 (1983) (prohibition on all political activity and any other
employment, with the exception of university teaching).
76. Lei Orghnica da Magistratura Nacional, Lei Complementar No. 35, art. 36 (I)&(Il)
(14 de marco 1979) (Braz.).
77. C6DIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, art. 322 (7th ed. 1977) (Chile).
78. See Blom-Cooper, Independence of the Judiciary, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, JUDICIAL
POWER AND PUBLIC LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL AcTs 19, 24 (1986); Morozzo della Rocca, The
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Latin America, however, one does not generally find a well-devel-
oped notion of judicial immunity from such lawsuits. On the con-
trary, most Latin American countries regard judges as citizens
fully exposed to criminal and civil liability for maliciously or negli-
gently applying the law.7"
V. FORMS OF INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Some countries, such as England and Israel, have managed to
achieve independent judiciaries without written constitutions."0 Al-
though it does not permit the courts to declare laws unconstitu-
tional, France has not only an independent judiciary, but also an
independent system of administrative courts that are technically
part of the executive."1 In contrast, a number of Latin American
countries with elaborate constitutional guarantees of judicial inde-
pendence have subservient judiciaries. The sad reality is that the
citadel of judicial independence has been perennially besieged in
Latin America. On occasion, the citadel has been seized, and the
judges sacked.
A. Formal Abrogation of Judicial Independence
Interference with judicial independence takes many forms.
The most obvious is the formal abrogation of judicial indepen-
dence. In 1977, a de facto military regime in Uruguay, a country
that had previously enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for judicial
independence, promulgated an astounding Institutional Act that
overtly abolished the independence of the judiciary. 2 The Act dis-
Different Forms of Personal Liability of the Judge, in id. at 54, 59, 61-62.
79. Lei OrgAnica da Magistratura Nacional, Lei Complementar No. 35, art. 49 (14 de
margo 1979)(Braz.); C6DIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, arts. 324-331 (7th ed. 1977) (Chile).
See generally J. BUSTAMENTE ALSINA, TEORIA GENERAL BE LA RESPONSIBILIDAD CIVIL 383-84
(2d ed. 1973); L. COLOMBO, 2 CULPA AQUILIANA 54-55 (1965).
80. This does not mean that England and Israel are without constitutions. Neither
country has a single document called the "Constitution," but parts of their so-called "un-
written constitutions" can be found in written documents. Thus, one finds the English Con-
stitution in documents such as the Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights,
the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Parliament Act. A. GOODHART, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 1
(1946). The emerging Israeli Constitution is found in five "basic laws." See Sager, Israel's
Dilatory Constitution, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 88, 93-99 (1976).
81. R. DAVID, supra note 6 at 24-25.
82. Acto Institutional No. 8, 1 de julio 1977 (Uru.). See generally, L. CORTIRAS- PELAEZ,
PODER EJEcUTIVO Y FUNCI6N JURISDICCIONAL (1982). For a detailed analysis of the military's
destruction of judicial independence in Uruguay, see THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, URUGUAY: THE END OF A NIGHTMARE? 43-54 (1984).
19871
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
carded the theory of a tripartite separation of powers, debunking it
as "a thesis incorrectly attributed to Montesquieu," and eliminated
the judiciary as a separate branch of government. The Uruguayan
courts were placed at the mercy of the Executive, which for four
years was granted discretion to dismiss any judge for any reason.
All court administrative functions were transferred to the Ministry
of Justice, which was granted full authority to set judicial salaries.
Not only did the Act drastically diminish the powers of the Su-
preme Court of Justice, it even removed "Supreme" from the
court's name.
Since the Castro takeover, Cuba has also formally abrogated
judicial independence. Castro's displeasure with the acquittal of
forty-five members of Batista's air force on a charge of genocide
led to the convening of a special panel to reverse the acquittal
(over protests from the bench and bar), and the reliance on "revo-
lutionary courts" for political trials.8 3 Judicial independence was
formally abolished by the Judicial Organizational Law of 1973,
which explicitly subordinated the judiciary to the Council of Min-
isters.84 That subservience was confirmed by the 1976 Constitution
and the 1977 Judicial Organization Law. The National Assembly
elects the Supreme Court, and People's Assemblies elect their re-
spective local courts. Judges must give accounts of their work to
the bodies responsible for their election, and the judges are subject
to recall. 6
B. Bypassing the Ordinary Courts
A second technique for undermining judicial independence in
Latin America is to transfer jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over
national security offenses to military or special tribunals. Excep-
tionally, a courageous court might declare the trial of civilians by
military courts unconstitutional, as the Colombian Supreme Court
did recently.8 7 In many countries, however (particularly those ruled
83. Salas, The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA L.J. 43, 45 (1983).
84. Ley de Organizaci6n del Sistema Judicial, Ley No. 1250, art. 3, No. 13 GACETA
OFIcIAL 57 (23 de junio 1973) (Cuba).
85. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA, art. 122 (1976); Ley de Organizaci6n del
Sistema Judicial, Ley No. 4 de 10 de agosto 1977, art. 4, No. 31 GACETA OFICIAL 299 (12 de
agosto 1977) (Cuba).
86. Comment, Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the Fidelista Interpretation of
Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TULANE L. REV. 1223, 1275-6 (1981).
87. Decision de 5 de marzo 1987, (Colom.) Sala Plena in 16 JURISPRUDENCIA V DOCTRINA
492 (May 1987).
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by de facto military governments), civilians accused of terrorism or
subversion have been tried before special or military tribunals
rather than by ordinary courts. Frequently, the ordinary courts
have been denied jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus or
amparo, or to review the proceedings on appeal. Brazil began this
process in 1965, enacting by military fiat an Institutional Act that
permitted military tribunals to try civilians accused of national se-
curity crimes.8 The Brazilian courts were effectively prevented
from invalidating the extension of military jurisdiction by a provi-
sion (which became boilerplate in all subsequent Institutional
Acts) excluding from judicial review all governmental actions
based upon the First and Second Institutional Acts. Institutional
Act No. 5 of 1968 made habeas corpus inapplicable to cases where
detention was ordered pursuant to charges based upon the Na-
tional Security Law, crimes against the social and economic order
or crimes against the popular economy. Institutional Act No. 6 re-
duced the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear ordinary appeals
from cases denying mandado de seguranca (writ of security) and
eliminated ordinary appeals from decisions of military tribunals
trying civilians for violations of national security.89 Recent research
into the archives of the Superior Military Tribunal reveals that
torture of defendants was commonplace and routinely ignored by
the military courts.' 0
In 1982, the military government in Guatemala enacted a de-
cree-law that provided for Tribunals of Special Jurisdiction to deal
with people accused of violating the state of siege or participating
in other subversive activity. Procedure was summary, with no
opportunity for appeal. Judges could be army officers with no
formal legal training, and the death penalty was mandated for
certain offenses.' 1  Similar legislation has been passed in
88. Ato Institucional No, 2, 27 de outubro 1965 (Braz.).
89. See K_ KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 214-219
(1975). See also Nadorff, Habeas Corpus and the Protection of Political and Civil Rights in
Brazil: 1962-1978, 14 LAW. AM. 297 (1982). Paradoxically, the Superior Military Tribunal
appeared to display significantly greater independence in dealing with those accused of sub-
version than did the packed Supreme Court. "A lei respeitada: 0 STM e a misso de julgar
processos politicos," Veja, Dec. 21, 1977, at 20, 22-26.
90. TORTURE IN BRAZIL, supra note 11; Wechsler, A Reporter at Large: A Miracle, a
Universe, The New Yorker, May 25, 1987, at 69, and June 1, 1987, at 72.
91. Decreto-Ley No. 46-82, Vol. CCXIX, No. 7, DIARIO DE CENTRO AMtRICA ANTES EL
GUATEMALTECO 171 (1 de julio 1982) (Guat.). For harsh criticism of the operation of this law,
see AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: NO NEUTRALS ALLOWED 85-99
(1982); Moyer & Padilla, Executions in Guatemala as Decreed by the Courts of Special
Jurisdiction in 1982-83: A Case Study, 6 HUMAN RTS. Q. 507 (1984).
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Argentina,9" Chile,93 Colombia, 4 El Salvador 5 and Uruguay."6
The Argentine Executive openly performed judicial duties in
1955 after the overthrow of Juan Per6n. Judicial functions were
exercised by the National Commission of Investigations, which,
under the leadership of the Vice President, was set up to deal with
the rectification of the irregularities of the Per6n regime. Addition-
ally, a National Board for the Recuperation of Patrimony was
granted judicial powers, including the power to confiscate property
without judicial proceedings.9 '
Two related jurisdictional problems have been the prolifera-
tion of special administrative courts and the development of a
broad political question doctrine. Many Latin American countries
have developed special administrative tribunals outside of the con-
trol of the regular judiciary and have delegated a substantial por-
tion of normal judicial jurisdiction to these special tribunals. The
most common special courts have been labor courts, and tax and
election tribunals. Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay have gone even
further by setting up separate systems of administrative courts fol-
lowing the French model.9 8 In situations where administrative
judges lack the guarantees of independence of the ordinary judici-
ary, the transference of jurisdiction diminishes judicial inde-
pendence. 9
Many Latin American judiciaries have voluntarily relin-
quished important aspects of their jurisdictional authority through
92. Ley No. 21.461, XXXVI-D A.D.L.A. 2895 (19 de noviembre 1976) (Argen.).
93. Decreto Ley No. 5 de 1973, No. 28.657 DIARIO OFICIAL (22 de septiembre 1973)
(Chile); Ley No. 18.314 de 15 de mayo 1984, No. 31.873 DIARtO OFICIAL 2354 (17 de mayo
1984) (Chile).
94. Decreto-Legislativo No. 2260 de 1976, Vol. CXIII, No. 34676 DIARIO OFICIAL 481 (17
de noviembre 1976) (Colom.); Decreto-Legislativo No. 1923 de 1978, Vol. CXV, No. 35101
DIARIO OFICIAL 1033 (21 de septiembre 1978) (Colom.). But see Decisions of the Sala Plena
of the Colombian Supreme Court declaring recent decrees creating Special Tribunals to try
certain serious crimes unconstitutional. 16 JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCTRINA 813, 829 (Aug. 1987).
95. Decreto No. 507, Vol. 269, No. 228 DIARIO OFIcIAL 18 (3 de diciembre 1980) (El
Sal.).
96. Ley No. 14.493 de 29 de diciembre 1975, Vol. 282, No. 19682 DIARIO OFIcIAL 19-A
(13 de enero 1976) (Uru.); Acto Institutional No. 8, 1 de julio de 1977 (Uru.); Acto Institu-
tional No. 12, 10 de noviembre 1981 (Uru.).
97. P. RAMELLA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 781-82 (3d ed. 1986).
98. See Fix Zamudio, Funci6n del Poder Judicial en los Sistemas Constitucionales La-
tinoamericanos, in UNAM, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURIDICAS, FUNCI6N DEL PODER JU-
DICIAL EN LOS SISTEMAS CONSTITUCIONALEs LATINOAMERICANOS 9, 21-25 (1977).
99. For discussion of this phenomenon in the context of Argentina, see J. DRoMI, EL
PODER JUDICIAL 105-26 (1982).
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the development of an exceedingly broad political question doc-
trine. Many of the issues regarded as political questions are simply
political acts of the executive that are treated as nonjusticiable
solely because of judicial timidity. While the political question doc-
trine has been narrowed substantially by the United States Su-
preme Court in the past twenty-five years,' 00 Latin American
courts have been generally reluctant to contract their broad view of
nonjusticiable political questions. 11
C. Wholesale Dismissal of Judges
Perhaps the most devastating attack on judicial independence
has been the wholesale purging of courts pursuant to institutional
acts issued by de facto regimes. Although most courts are left in-
tact after a golpe, this general rule has conspicuous exceptions,
most notably Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Peru. Despite a
constitutional guaranty of lifetime tenure, the Argentine Supreme
Court has been replaced en masse six times in the past thirty-one
years. In 1946, all but one of the Court's members were removed
by a Per6n-dominated Congress on trumped up impeachment
charges. In 1957, the military regime that had ousted Per6n two
years earlier summarily dismissed the entire Per6n-appointed Su-
preme Court. In 1966, another military takeover resulted in the re-
placement of the entire Supreme Court. After the election of a
Peronist regime in 1973, all members of the Supreme Court re-
signed. In 1976, the entire Supreme Court was once again ousted
after yet another military takeover." 2 The Junta that assumed
power in 1976 suspended the tenure of all federal judges, perma-
nently removing twenty-four of them from office, as well as dis-
charging the judges of the provincial supreme courts. Finally, in
1983, the return of democracy resulted once again in the replace-
ment of the entire Supreme Court. 3
The Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal, whose independence
in granting habeas corpus was a major irritant to the de facto mili-
100. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
101. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 98, at 38-39. See also Ovalle Favela, supra note 49,
at 74; Garro, supra note 11, at 326-36; Pkrez Guilhou, La Corte y el Gobierno de Facto
Argentino, in I1 CONGRESSO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, 9 UNAM ANUARIO
JURIDiCO, 811 (J. Carpizo ed. 1982).
102. See Rosenn & Katz, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 573 n. 30 (1980).
103. See Garro, supra note 11, at 314-15.
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tary regime, has been treated like a suitcase. In 1965, the military
government issued an institutional act permitting it to pack the
Tribunal by increasing its size from eleven to sixteen judges. Three
years later, it was unpacked by the forced retirement of three
highly independent judges, the resignation (under protest) of the
Chief Justice, and an age-induced retirement. At this time, another
institutional act reduced the size of the Court from sixteen to
eleven judges.1 '
The military junta that took power in El Salvador in 1979 re-
placed the entire Supreme Court with appointees sympathetic to
the regime.105 In 1969, Peru's military government dismissed all of
the judges of the Supreme Court and replaced them with judges
more sympathetic to the aims of the military.106 The new govern-
ment also formed a military-dominated National Council of Jus-
tice, assigning it the power to appoint all judges." 7 The same stat-
ute that created the Council also dismissed the entire Supreme
Court, permitting the military-dominated Council to appoint
judges more congenial to the government. In 1973, at the instiga-
tion of President Velasco, the Council dismissed the entire crimi-
nal division of the Supreme Court because Velasco was unhappy
with the outcome of a case. During the course of the Velasco re-
gime, the judicial retirement age was often modified to permit the
appointment of new judges or to replace those jurists deemed un-
acceptable to the military government.08
D. Transference or Reassignment of Judges
Another method of interference with judicial independence
has been the transference or reassignment of judges. In some coun-
tries, judges who have made politically unpopular decisions have
been reassigned to less desirable posts as punishment for their as-
sertions of independence. For example, in El Salvador after Judge
104. See K KARST & K. ROSENN, supra note 89, at 214-215..
105. AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE & ACLU, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR
45 (Supp. July 20, 1982). For a chilling depiction of the collapse of the administration of
justice in El Salvador, see DeWind & Kass, Justice in El Salvador: A Report of a Mission of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 38 REC. AB. CITY N.Y. 112 (1983).
106. Decreto-Ley No. 18060 de 23 de diciembre 1969 (Peru); Decreto-Ley No. 18061 de
23 de diciembre 1969 (Peru).
107. Decreto-Ley No. 18060 de 23 de diciembre 1969, arts. 7-9 (Peru); Decreto-Ley No.
18831 de 13 de abril 1971 (Peru).
108. S. ROSE, THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION'S APPROACH: INVESTMENT POLICY AND CLIMATE
- 1968-1980, 321 (1981).
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Bernardo Rauda Murcia courageously sentenced five members of
the National Guard to long prison terms after a jury found them
guilty of the 1980 murders of four American nuns, the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions and transferred Judge Rauda to
northern Chalatenango Province. This is an area of frequent
clashes between leftists guerrillas and army units and requires a
four hour round-trip bus ride from the Judge's home in San Salva-
dor, a commute occasionally enlivened by rebel ambushes and
army sweeps.' Certainly, in some circumstances transfers may be
necessary for administrative reasons, but it is important to differ-
entiate between transfers that are in accordance with sound ad-
ministrative practices and those that are plainly punitive.
E. The Illusory Guaranty of Irreducible Salaries
In most Latin American countries, constitutional guarantees of
the irreducibility of judicial salaries have been rendered illusory by
chronic inflation. Consequently, the chronically low level of judicial
salaries in many Latin American countries often has been cited as
a principal source of judicial corruption."10 In 1985, the average an-
nual inflation rate in Latin America (excluding Cuba) was an
astonishing 704.8%. (This rate falls to 91.6% if one excludes Bo-
livia, whose inflation rate of 11,743 % substantially distorts the pic-
ture.)111 At times Argentine inflation so reduced the real economic
value of judicial salaries that restaurant waiters in Buenos Aires
were earning more than the President of the Supreme Court."'
Many Argentine judges have resigned for economic reasons. In re-
cent years the Argentine Supreme Court has publicly requested
that the Executive and the Legislature substantially increase judi-
cial compensation to keep pace with inflation." 8 In 1985, the Ar-
109. Le Moyne, The Case of a Salvadoran Judge: Does Valor Pay?, N.Y. Times, May 3,
1985, at A2, col. 1-4. The background of this case and the enormous effort required by U.S.
representatives to force prosecution are set out in Posner & Greathead, Justice in El Salva-
dor: A Report of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights on the Investiga-
tion into the Killing of Four U.S. Churchwomen, 14 COLuM. HuMAN RTS. L. REV. 191 (1983).
110. Venezuela's President recently urged all sectors of society to unite in a campaign
to drive out judges who "enrich themselves in illegal ways" in Venezuela's corrupt, over-
loaded and underfunded judicial system. Lusinchi Condemns Corrupt Judges, Latin Am.
Reg. Rep. Andean Group Rep., July 30, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
111. Computed from INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PRO-
GRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 1986 REPORT 22 (1986). Only two Latin American countries, Pan-
ama and Honduras, had single digit inflation rates in 1985.
112. De Onis, Isabelita's Terrible Legacy, N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 21, 1976, at 15.
113. Acordada No. 30, 12 de junio 1985, 1985-D L.L. 170 (Argen.); Acordada No. 6,
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gentine Supreme Court finally decided that the constitutional
guaranty against the nondiminution of judicial salaries must be in-
terpreted in real, rather than nominal, terms, thereby affirming a
lower court decision requiring monetary correction of judicial sala-
ries in order to compensate for real losses caused by inflation.114
Even in the United States, where inflation has been far less chronic
and severe than in most countries of Latin America, the value of
judicial salaries has declined sharply in real terms, resulting in a
substantial number of judicial resignations, as well as lawsuits by
judges challenging the constitutionality of Congressional failure to
raise salaries.115 Only if the constitutional guaranty is interpreted
to require the maintenance of the real, as opposed to the nominal,
value of judicial salaries can it be a meaningful safeguard of judi-
cial independence in an inflationary economy."'
F. Failure to Enforce Judicial Decisions
Alexander Hamilton elegantly made the point that the judici-
ary, possessing neither the power of the sword nor of the purse,
must ultimately depend upon the executive to enforce court deci-
sions.17 Refusal of the executive to enforce judicial decisions that
it does not agree with seriously undermines the independence of
the judiciary. Because the cost of such refusal is generally a break-
down in law and order, most regimes deem the price too high to
pay. A conspicuous exception occurred in Chile under the Allende
regime, which adopted the policy of ignoring court decisions order-
ing the return of illegally occupied land and illegally seized facto-
ries."' In May 1973, the Supreme Court of Chile sent an official
letter to Allende, stating:
This Court must protest to you, as it has done innumerable
times in the past, about the illegal acts of the administrative
authorities who are illicitly interfering with the proper exercise
of judicial power, and who are preventing the police force from
carrying out criminal sentences duly emanating from the crimi-
1984-D L.L. 425 (Argen.); Acordada No. 55, 1984-D L.L. 572 (Argen.).
114. Bonorino Per6 v. Estado Nacional, 116 E.D. 321 (Nov. 15, 1985) (Argen.).
115. See Rosenn, supra note 37, at 310.
116. Id. at 339-42.
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
118. Velasco, supra note 15, at 723-26; Comment, Chile under Allende: The Decline of
the Judiciary and the Rise of a State of Necessity, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 693, 700-
01(1987).
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nal courts. . . . These acts signify a decided obstinacy in rebel-
ling against judicial sentences and a total lack of concern about
the alteration that these attitudes and omissions have produced
in the juridical order. All of this no longer means a simple crisis
of state under the rule of Law, . . . but a peremptory or immi-
nent rupture of the country's legality.11
Allende rejected the Supreme Court's charges in a long letter
severely critical of the Court for preferring claims of the rich to
claims of the poor. He continued to insist upon the right of the
executive, "as warrantor of peace and public order," to review
every judicial decision and make an independent determination of
which should be enforced. A few months later Allende was ousted
by the military, which made it plain that one of the primary rea-
sons for its taking power was the reestablishment of the constitu-
tional and juridical order.1 2
G. Executive Domination
Despite the constitutional configurations providing for three
coequal branches of government, historically, Latin American
countries have been dominated by the executive. The checks built
into the system are far from being equally balanced. Conse-
quently, any judge who attempts to frustrate the will of the execu-
tive does so at great peril to his job security. The examples of
strong Latin American executives running roughshod over the
courts are legion. Trujillo, who ruled the Dominican Republic with
an iron fist, reportedly held undated letters of resignation from
each member of the Supreme Court and filled in the date when-
ever he was displeased with any decision.2 ' In 1964, Papa Doc
Duvalier summarily dismissed Douyon, the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court, and chastised the remaining justices because the Su-
preme Court had been too slow to praise the President-for-Life.
For many years, Haitian judicial decisions were required to con-
form strictly to the wishes of the Duvaliers.'2 2 In Paraguay, the
courts still are dominated totally by President Stroessner. 12 3 For-
119. Cited in Velasco, supra note 15, at 726.
120. Comment, supra note 118, at 706-07.
121. H. WIARDA, DICTATORSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE METHODS OF CONTROL IN TRU-
JILLO'S DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 64-65 (1968).
122. Verner, supra note 18, at 500-01.
123. Although theoretically the Paraguayan Supreme Court has the power to declare
statutes and presidential acts unconstitutional, it has never dared to exercise that power
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mer Ecuadorean President Velasco Ibarra's response to the Su-
preme Court's invalidating several controversial executive decrees
was to abrogate the 1967 Constitution, reform the Supreme Court,
and seize dictatorial powers." 4
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The lack of judicial independence is a chronic problem in
Latin America. A recent assessment by two eminent Mexican ju-
rists concluded that Costa Rica is the only Latin American country
where the judiciary is truly independent.' 5 Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela were con-
sidered to have independent judiciaries but subject to interference
by the executive, while Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay
and Uruguay were regarded as definitely lacking judicial indepen-
dence." ' One can take issue with many of the conclusions in this
incomplete impressionistic survey. Nevertheless, the underlying
message-that Latin America as a region suffers from a judicial
independence deficiency-seems undeniable. Yet this does not
mean that Latin American judiciaries are corrupt, incompetent, or
poorly trained. Nor does it mean that the majority of cases will not
be resolved on the merits in accordance with the judge's proper
application of the governing law. As a rule, Latin American judges
are dedicated, scrupulous professionals. Indeed, many Latin Amer-
ican jurists deservedly enjoy high international esteem for their
scholarship and dedicated work on international legal projects.
Any attempt to explain the reasons for the lack of judicial in-
dependence in Latin America must be tentative. One has to take
into account the substantial differences between the governmental
systems of the twenty countries comprising the region. One must
also consider that the degree of judicial independence has differed
significantly over time. Nevertheless, certain important structural
since Stroessner has been president. Judges are appointed for terms of only five years, and
renewal depends upon currying presidential favor. Moreover, no constitutional provision
prevents the Stroessner-dominated Congress from reducing their salaries during their term
in office or from impeaching them. P. LEWIS, PARAGUAY UNDER STROESSNER 110-11 (1980).
See also AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, RULE BY FEAR: PARAGUAY AFTER THIRTY YEARS UNDER
STROESSNER 45 (1985).
124. J. MARTZ, ECUADOR: CONFLICTING POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE QUEST FOR PROGRESS
80 (1972).
125. Carpizo & Fix-Zamudio, La Necesidad y la Legitimidad de la Revisi6n Judicial
en Amr&ica Latina. Desarollo Reciente, 52 BOL. MEX. DER. COMP. 31, 50 (1985).
126. Id.
[Vol. 19:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
aspects of Latin American legal culture and political experience
seem to be critical for the region as a whole.
First, Latin America is heir to the civil law tradition, in which
the judge has historically been a weak figure. In no civil law coun-
try do judges have the power, prestige, and deference enjoyed by
judges in the United States, particularly at the federal level. Un-
like his common law counterpart, a civil law judge does not have
the power to punish the defiance of his orders by jailing the recal-
citrant party for contempt of court. Civilians have tended to regard
judges as expert technicians whose sole function is to apply the law
to the facts. An independent, creative role for the judge in the civil
law tradition has long been denied. 27 Yet virtually all Latin Amer-
ican countries have grafted the institution of judicial review on this
civil law trunk. 128 Judicial review presupposes a strong judiciary
with the independence, prestige, and experience to perform the
delicate balancing of individual and societal interests that goes
into constitutional adjudication. Most Latin American courts are
staffed by career judges with no independent political base or con-
tacts and with relatively narrow experience. Asking them to per-
form this function (particularly in the context of exercising the
power to declare statutes unconstitutional erga omnes) is to plunge
them into a political role for which they are ill-prepared by both
temperament and experience.
Second, the legitimacy of the judiciary, like that of the legal
order, stems from the constitution. Unfortunately, Latin American
constitutions are notoriously short-lived and often violated. Since
gaining their respective independence, the twenty Latin American
republics have promulgated 267 constitutions, an average of 13.4
per country. Each golpe ruptures the preexisting constitutional or-
der, leaving the judiciary in the unenviable position of trying to
maintain a de jure institutional authority in a de facto regime.
Any regime that comes to power by extraconstitutional means is
unlikely to brook any active interference with the exercise of the
extraordinary powers it has assumed, and even less so from a hold-
over from the ancien regime. Revolutions generally wreak havoc
with judicial independence, and revolutions have abounded in
Latin America since 1808, when Napoleon initiated Latin
America's chronic legitimacy crisis by placing his brother Joseph, a
127. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 36-39 (lst ed. 1969).
128. See Rosenn, supra note 24, at 785.
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commoner, on the throne of Spain. ' 9 One ineluctably clear lesson
from the Latin American experience is that constitutional guaran-
tees of judicial independence do not by themselves produce an in-
dependent judiciary.
Third, Latin American constitutions provide for the suspen-
sion of many important constitutional guarantees during states of
emergency."' 0 The most abused of these states of emergency is the
state of siege.'"' Although they are supposedly temporary juridical
situations reserved for times of great emergency, states of siege
have been maintained for years in a number of Latin American
countries despite the absence of any external threats. Declaration
of a state of siege does not necessarily prevent a judiciary from
functioning independently, but its practical effect is to reduce con-
siderably the judiciary's sphere of action in protecting constitu-
tional rights from governmental abuse. Consequently, long-term
usage of the state of siege or its functional equivalents has sub-
stantially hindered judicial independence in many Latin American
countries by making the protection of individual constitutional
rights impossible.
Fourth, Latin American culture and political tradition are
heavily authoritarian. The pattern of executive domination is not
accidental. Rather, it reflects the Roman law tradition of granting
autocratic powers to the emperors and paterfamilias, the corpora-
tivism and patrimonialism of colonial rule, and the hierarchical
structure of the Catholic church.1" Despite extensive constitu-
tional rhetoric, the principle that the government should be sub-
ject to the rule of law does not come naturally to most of Latin
America. The underlying notion that the government is above the
law does not bode well for judicial independence.
Fifth, corruption is an endemic problem in many Latin Ameri-
129. See K. KARST & K. ROSENN. supra note 89, at 184-86.
130. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY:
THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1983).
131. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (OAS), PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE
STATE OF SEIGE AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 1, 5-8 (1963).
132. Wiarda, Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-
Latin Tradition: The Corporate Model, 25 WORLD POLITICS 206, 210-212 (1973); Wiarda,
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can judicial systems8 3 In some countries, court personnel, particu-
larly the clerks, are so poorly paid that the acceptance of bribes
has become a regular practice that badly distorts the decision-
making process. 34 Judicial independence ceases to exist when the
quality of justice is dependent upon the wealth of the briber.
Sixth, although the formal legal systems of Latin American
countries are universalistic and egalitarian, the true commitment
to equality under the law is quite superficial. The courts are arenas
where elites have been zealously fighting rearguard battles in order
to preserve their power and privileges against attacks from groups
that would also reject a universalistic legal system and an indepen-
dent judiciary if they ever were to come to power. Absent a spirit
of moderation and a willingness to compromise with conflicting so-
cietal groups, establishment of a truly independent judiciary will
be difficult.
Overcoming these structural obstacles to judicial indepen-
dence is not easy, but as the example of Costa Rica indicates, the
task is not impossible."' On the other hand, Costa Rica not only
has a long tradition of effective democratic government without
military interference and a long history of respect for the rule of
law, but it also has abolished the military. Because these condi-
tions are not readily replicable in most of Latin America, the path
to judicial independence is likely to continue to be slow and
tortuous.
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